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only under stringent conditions, since spectral measures of risk do not take the regulated entity’s
relation to the market portfolio into account. To give more insights, we characterize the set of
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1. Introduction
Risk management is of crucial importance considering the enormous ﬁnancial risk our
economy is exposed to. The risks of many economic agents are regulated by various insti-
tutions. For example, if a ﬁnancial trader wants to sell options, which give the buyer rights
of buying or selling at a given price during a speciﬁed time horizon (or at a given time), he
has to fulﬁl margin requirements, i.e. he has to deposit some cash or some other riskless
and liquid instrument. An exchange’s clearing ﬁrm, which is responsible for the promises
to all parties of transactions being securely completed, requires margin deposits. A mea-
sure of risk can be used to determine the margin requirement. The riskier the trader’s port-
folio, the more the margin requirement should be.
Other external regulators, at an international level, are the International Actuarial
Association (IAA) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), who deter-
mine the capital requirements for insurance companies. Similarly, the Basel Committee
gives guidelines for the acceptable level of capital on banking supervision. Since a govern-
ment or central bank could be a lender of last resort for these institutions, and the default
of them could cause serious problems, they are regulated as well. As an internal regulator,
a portfolio manager has to regulate the risk of its traders. In the context of a multi-division
ﬁrm setting, the head-oﬃce may also set risk-limits for the divisions. Internally the risk
values can also be used for planning and performance evaluation. It is therefore crucial
to measure risk in an appropriate way.
We will use the term portfolio when referring to a risky entity (portfolio, ﬁrm, insurance
company, bank, etc.). The value of a portfolio might change due to all kinds of uncertain
events. We relate risk to the probability distribution of the future value of the portfolio.
For the sake of simplicity in this paper we use discrete random variables. Our approach
can be extended to the case of continuous risks and risks with unbounded support. All this
requires is an analysis of competitive equilibrium in such an environment. The interested
reader is referred to Chapter 10 of Duﬃe (2001).
Ameasureofrisk assigns areal number toarandomvariable. Itisthe minimal amountof
cash the regulated agent has to add to his portfolio, and to invest in a zero coupon bond.
Coherent measures of risk (Artzner et al., 1999) are deﬁned by four axioms: monotonicity,
subadditivity,positivehomogeneityandtranslationinvariance.Whenaddingtwomoreaxi-
oms: law invariance and comonotonic additivity we get a subclass of coherent measures of
risk, namely spectral measures of risk (Acerbi, 2002). Expected shortfall is a well-known
spectral measure of risk (Acerbi and Tasche, 2002). For an introduction to risk measures
and the above mentioned axioms see for instance Chapter 4 of Fo ¨llmer and Schied (2002).
Our approach is to model the situation at hand as an exchange economy in a general
equilibrium (GE) setting, and determine which axioms are compatible with this model,
and whether other axioms emerge as natural. This approach has the advantage that it rec-
ognizes the fact that the risk of a portfolio depends on the other assets present in the econ-
omy (the market portfolio), an insight that is generated immediately by the Capital Asset
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like to contribute to the research agenda that connects ﬁnance to GE theory, see for
instance Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990), Magill and Quinzii (1996), Leroy and Werner
(2001),o rJaschke and Ku ¨chler (2001). The corresponding measure of risk of a portfolio
would be the amount of cash needed to sell the risk involved in the portfolio to the market.
More precisely, the so-called GE measure of risk of a portfolio would be the negative of its
equilibrium market price.
We prove that GE measures of risk are coherent and comonotonic additive measures of
risk. However, GE measures of risk fail to satisfy law invariance, i.e. they are functions of
not only the probability distributions of the portfolios, since they also take the regulated
entity’s relation to the market portfolio into account. Nevertheless we show that GE mea-
sures of risk satisfy a generalized notion of law invariance. To check on which domain
spectral measures of risk are GE measures of risk, we consider a general domain for the
measures of risk. We ﬁnd that the corresponding domain is very small. To give more
insights, we characterize GE measures of risk as the only measures of risk satisfying the
property that we call the pricing kernel property.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss coherent measures of
risk. In Section 3 spectral measures of risk are considered. Using the exchange economy
model of Section 4 the properties of GE measures of risk are investigated in Section 5.
In Section 6 we show that spectral measures of risk are GE measures of risk only under
stringent conditions, and we characterize GE measures of risk via the pricing kernel prop-
erty. We conclude in Section 7.
2. Coherent measures of risk
Consider a set V   R
S of realization vectors, where S denotes the number of states of
nature. State of nature s occurs with probability ps > 0 and
PS
s¼1ps ¼ 1. The vector X 2 V
represents a portfolio’s (ﬁrm’s, insurance company’s, bank’s, etc.) possible proﬁt and loss
realizations on a common chosen future time horizon, say at t = 1. The amount Xs is the
portfolio’s payoﬀ in state of nature s. Negative values of Xs correspond to losses. The
inequality Y P X means that Ys P Xs for all s =1 ,...,S. We deﬁne R+ = [0,1), R++ =
(0,1), R  =(  1,0], respectively. The discrete random variable generated by p 2 R
S
þþ
and X 2 V is denoted by b X, i.e. Pðb X ¼ X sÞ¼ps, for all s =1 ,...,S.
A measure of risk is a function q : V ! R measuring the risk of a portfolio from the
perspective of the present (t = 0). It is the minimal amount of cash the regulated agent
has to add to his portfolio, and to invest in a reference instrument today, such that it
ensures that the risk involved in the portfolio is acceptable to the regulator.
3 We assume
that the reference instrument has payoﬀ 1 in each state of nature at t = 1, thus its realiza-
tion vector is 1 = (1,...,1)2 V. The reference instrument is riskless in the ‘‘classical
sense’’, having no uncertainty in its payoﬀs. It is most natural to think of it as a zero cou-
pon bond. The price of the reference instrument, the discount factor is denoted by d 2 Rþ.
We adjust the deﬁnition of coherent measures of risk to the discrete case with realiza-
tion vectors on a general domain V as follows.
3 The measure of risk can also be negative, meaning that a portfolio remains acceptable if a certain amount of
cash is withdrawn from it.
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1999) if it satisﬁes the following axioms:.
1. Monotonicity: for all X,Y 2 V such that Y P X, we have q(Y) 6 q(X).
2. Subadditivity: for all X,Y 2 V such that X + Y 2 V, we have q(X + Y) 6 q(X)+q(Y).
3. Positive homogeneity: for all X 2 V ;h 2 Rþ such that hX 2 V, we have q(hX)=hq(X).
4. Translation invariance: for all X 2 V and a 2 R such that X + a1 2 V, we have
q(X + a1)=q (X)   da.
The axioms are motivated as follows.
By monotonicity, if a portfolio Y is always worth at least as much as X (event by event),
then Y cannot be riskier than X.
Subadditivity says that if we combine two portfolios, the risk is not greater than the
sum of the risks associated with each: it captures the notion of diversiﬁcation. If an
exchange’s measure of risk would fail to satisfy this property, then a trader could be better
oﬀ by splitting his position, opening two accounts and decreasing the margin require-
ments. The same motivation applies to ﬁrms, banks, insurance companies, etc. For
instance, for the case of internal capital budgeting, if the measure of risk satisﬁes subad-
ditivity, then the head oﬃce can be sure that by setting risk limits to the divisions, the risk
of the whole ﬁrm will be smaller than the sum of the individual risk limits. This enables the
head oﬃce to decentralize the risk constraints.
Positive homogeneity requires that portfolio size should linearly inﬂuence risk.
Translation invariance ensures that the measure of risk is expressed in appropriate
units. It means that investing an amount da > 0 (or da < 0) of cash into a units of reference
instrument at t = 0 leads to the payoﬀ vector a1 at t = 1 and decreases (respectively:
increases) the measure of risk by da.
For further motivation of the axioms see Artzner et al. (1999).
The four axioms above seem natural, but one can easily create counterexamples show-
ing that the rather popular Value at Risk (VaR) is not subadditive in general and hence it
is not a coherent measure of risk, see for instance Artzner et al. (1999),o rEmbrechts et al.
(2002). However, according to Embrechts et al. (2002) VaR is coherent for elliptically dis-
tributed risks. Moreover, Ibragimov (2005) shows that VaR satisﬁes the coherency axioms
for not extremely heavy-tailed risks with ﬁnite means and convolutions of a-symmetric
risks with a > 1, but VaR always lacks the coherency property for extremely heavy-tailed
risks with inﬁnite ﬁrst moments and convolutions of a-symmetric risks with a <1 .A sa
byproduct checking the relevance of the coherency axioms from a general equilibrium per-
spective enables us to assess this criticism on VaR as well.
3. Spectral measures of risk
Acerbi (2002) treats spectral measures of risk in case of discrete random variables
with equiprobable outcomes, i.e. when p1 =    = pS =1 / S, as a special case. He assumes
that the discount factor is 1, and the domain is R
S. In this paper we explicitly want to
use the discount factor, which for the moment is exogenously determined here as the
price of the reference instrument. Since in the general equilibrium model the discount
factor will be determined endogenously, we have to multiply Acerbi (2002)’s deﬁnition
by d. Our model is a generalization also in the sense that we consider a general domain
2520 P. Cso ´ka et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 31 (2007) 2517–2534V   R
S. The deﬁnition of spectral measures of risk with equiprobable outcomes is as
follows.
Let us introduce the ordered statistics Xs:S given by the ordered values of the S-tuple
X1,...,XS, i.e. {X1:S,...,XS:S}={ X1,...,XS}a n dX1:S 6 X2:S 6    6 XS:S.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let the outcomes be equiprobable. Consider a domain V   RS,a n da





is a spectral measure of risk if / 2 R
S satisﬁes the conditions




3. Monotonicity: /s is non-increasing, i.e. /s1 P /s2 if s1 < s2 and s1,s2 2 {1,...,S}.
Spectral measures of risk are calculated as discounted weighted average losses, with
non-increasing weights, with the highest weight on the worst outcome. The weight vector
/ is the so-called risk spectrum. It can be interpreted as expressing the attitude toward risk.
As a special case we have the following deﬁnition.








The k-expected shortfall is the discounted average of the worst k outcomes. With an
unrestricted domain, i.e. if V ¼ R
S, Acerbi (2002) has the following result.
Proposition 3.3. Assume V ¼ RS. A measure of risk M/ : V ! R is coherent if and only if it
is a spectral measure of risk as deﬁned by Deﬁnition 3.1.
Proof. Acerbi (2002, Theorem 5.3). h
Of course on a restricted domain, i.e. if V   R
S, spectral measures of risk still satisfy the
four coherency axioms. However, as the following three examples show, depending on V
one might ﬁnd other measures of risk M/ : V ! R that are coherent but not spectral mea-
sures of risk.
Example 3.4. As a trivial example, let V contain only one vector, X. In this case all
measures of risk, i.e. all functions q : V ! R satisfy the six axioms, since there are no two
vectors on which the axioms of monotonicity, subadditivity, etc. could be checked. Note






X s:S 6 qðXÞ 6  dX 1:S: ð3Þ
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S such that M/ = q and M/ is a spectral
measure of risk.
Interestingly, Eq. (3) can also be justiﬁed using majorization theory. A vector / 2 R
S is
said to be majorized by a vector c 2 R


















 ð /1;...;/SÞ ð 1;0;...;0Þ: ð4Þ
It follows from 3.H.2.c and 4.b.7 in Marshall and Olkin (1979) that M/ is Schur-convex in
/, i.e. if /1   /2, then for any X 2 V we have that M/1ðXÞ 6 M/2ðXÞ. From this observa-
tion and the relations in (4), Eq. (3) follows immediately.
Example 3.5. In his proof of Theorem 5.3 (Proposition 3.3 here) Acerbi (2002) shows
for the case V ¼ RS that if a measure of risk M/ : V ! R is monotone, then its risk
spectrum / should be nonnegative. If for a certain s we have that /s < 0, then for any
X 2 V an increase in Xs:S gives rise to a higher measure of risk, contradicting
monotonicity.
However, for many domains V, positivity is not required for monotonicity. Consider a
domain V ¼ RS 1
   f 0g. In this case the best outcome of any portfolio is zero, thus the
weight of the best outcome, /S can be negative, since the best outcome cannot be
increased. So although / is not nonnegative everywhere, the measure of risk remains
monotone.
Example 3.6. In his proof of Theorem 5.3 (Proposition 3.3 here) Acerbi (2002) also shows
for the case V ¼ R
S that if a measure of risk M/ : V ! R is translation invariant, then its
risk spectrum / should be normalized. If / is not normalized, then it is easy to check that
translation invariance fails. It sufﬁces to consider M/(X) and M/(Y), where Y = X + a1,
and a 2 R;a 6¼ 0.
For general domains V, normalization is not required for translation invariance. For
instance, translation invariance is trivially satisﬁed if there are no two vectors X and Y
such that X = Y + a1 for some a 2 R;a 6¼ 0. In this case translation invariance does not
have bite and normalization can be omitted.
Any measure of risk M/ : V ! R and in particular spectral measures of risk can be
shown to satisfy the axioms of law-invariance and comonotonic additivity, since they use
the ordered statistics of a portfolio. The deﬁnitions of these two axioms are as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.7. A measure of risk q : V ! R is law invariant if for all X,Y 2 V such that for
all s =1 ,...,S,
Prðb X ¼ X sÞ¼Prðb Y ¼ X sÞ;
we have q(X)=q(Y).
Law invariance of q means that the measure of risk is a function of the probability dis-
tribution (law) only. Note that two random variables b X and b Y can be diﬀerent despite the
fact that they have the same probability distribution. Acerbi (2004) explains that law
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will point out in Section 5 that the portfolios’ relations to the economy as a whole are also
important, which will be shown to violate the law invariance axiom. For instance, if two
portfolios have diﬀerent covariances with the market portfolio, then the regulator may
perceive their risk diﬀerently, even if their probability distribution is the same.
Another characteristic of spectral measures of risk is comonotonic additivity.
Deﬁnition 3.8. Two realization vectors X 2 RS and Y 2 RS are comonotonic if for all
s1,s2 2 {1,...,S},
ðX s1   X s2ÞðY s1   Y s2Þ P 0: ð5Þ
A map q : V ! R is comonotonic additive if given two comonotonic realization vectors
X,Y 2 V such that X + Y 2 V the map displays additivity, i.e. we have q(X + Y)=q(X)+
q(Y).
Comonotonicity is a very strong form of dependence that two realization vectors X and
Y can display. If two portfolios are comonotonic, then their value will always move up and
down together event by event, providing no diversiﬁcation at all when added to each other.
The measure of risk of a portfolio consisting of two comonotonic subportfolios should
therefore be equal to the sum of the measures of risk of the subportfolios. Using random
variables the deﬁnition of comonotonicity is as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.9. Two random variables b X and b Y are comonotonic if b X ¼ fðb Y Þ (almost
surely) for some increasing function f : R ! R.
The deﬁnitions of comonotonicity for realization vectors and random variables are
equivalent.
For two random variables with continuous distributions b X and b Y the inequality in (5)
holds for their realization vectors X and Y if and only if we have that the probability of
concordance deﬁned by Pððb X   b X 0Þðb Y   b Y 0Þ P 0Þ¼1 and consequently the probability
of discordance given by Pððb X   b X 0Þðb Y   b Y 0Þ 6 0Þ¼0, where b X 0 and b Y 0 are independent
copies of b X and b Y . In this case, one of the commonly used measures of dependence, Ken-
dall’s tau deﬁned by
qs ¼ Pððb X   b X
0Þðb Y   b Y
0Þ P 0Þ Pððb X   b X
0Þðb Y   b Y
0Þ 6 0Þð 6Þ
reaches its maximum value, i.e. qs = 1. From Theorem 3 in Embrechts et al. (2002) it fol-
lows that qs = 1 is equivalent with saying that b X and b Y are comonotonic as deﬁned by
Deﬁnition 3.9. For Kendall’s tau and related measures of dependence see for instance
Chapter 5 in Nelsen (1999).
Tasche (2002) shows that in the continuous, non-atomic case spectral measures of risk
are the only coherent measures of risk satisfying law-invariance and comonotonic additiv-
ity. As his proof requires non-atomic probability distributions, in the discrete, equiprob-
able case a new proof is required for the analogous statement. The proposition requires an
unrestricted domain, i.e. V ¼ R
S.
Proposition 3.10. Assume that the outcomes are equiprobable and V ¼ RS. Then a measure
of risk is coherent, law invariant and comonotonic additive if and only if it is a spectral
measure of risk as deﬁned by Deﬁnition 3.1.
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(() The coherency part follows from Proposition 3.3. Law invariance and comono-
tonic additivity follows from the fact that spectral measures of risk are using the ordered
statistics of a realization vector.
()) Take any law invariant and comonotonic additive measure of risk q : RS ! R
satisfying the four coherency axioms. We will show that law invariance and comonotonic
additivity of q implies that it can be written in the form of Eq. (1), i.e. there exists a vector





Law invariance of q implies that for all X 2 R
S any permutation of X has the same mea-
sure of risk. A particular permutation is the ordered statistics vector of X,[ Xs:S]. Using the
notation X ¼f X 2 R
SjX 1 6 X 2 6    6 X Sg for the space of ordered statistics, we have
that for all X 2 R
S the measure of risk q can be written as a function f : X ! R of the
ordered statistics vector,
qðXÞ¼fð½X s:S Þ: ð8Þ
Comonotonic additivity of q implies that f is linear on X. Choosing S independent vectors
in X implies that f is additive separable with constant weight functions   /1;...;   /S 2 R, i.e.
fð½X s:S Þ ¼   /1X 1:S þ   þ  /SX S:S: ð9Þ
Using /s ¼ 
  /s
d ;s ¼ 1;...;S we have that Eq. (7) is satisﬁed. Proposition 3.3 implies that
q should be a spectral measure of risk. h
It is cumbersome to generalize the deﬁnition of spectral measures of risk to the case in
which the outcomes are not equiprobable. Consider the following example.
Example 3.11. In Table 1 we have four states of nature with equal probability of
occurrence. Portfolios X and Y, their ordered statistics, and the risk spectrum / are also
given. A straightforward calculation gives M/(X) = 0, and M/(Y) = 3.5d.
Since the portfolios X and Y have the same outcome in states of nature 2, 3 and 4, we
can merge those states. This operation leads to Table 2, with portfolios X0 and Y0, where
the generalized discrete risk spectrum /
g is given by /
g
1 ¼ /1 and /
g
2 ¼ /2 þ /3 þ /4.
Table 1
Spectral measures of risk with equiprobable outcomes
sp s Xs Xs:S Ys Ys:S /s
1 0.25  3  31  4 0.4
2 0.25 2 2  4  4 0.3
3 0.25 2 2  4  4 0.2
4 0.25 2 2  4 1 0.1
Table 2









1 0.25  3  31  4 0.4
2 0.75 2 2  4 1 0.6





sXs:S we have that M/ðXÞ¼M/
gðX0Þ¼0, but
M/(Y) = 3.5d, whereas M/
gðY 0Þ¼d. To avoid this problem, within the discrete setting
a different /
g should be speciﬁed for all the orderings of the portfolio vectors. This would
rather complicate the analysis and would not add much value since with splitting up the
states and increasing their number any discrete distribution can be arbitrarily closely
approximated by equiprobable states. Thus we will use the discrete, equiprobable version
of spectral measures of risk as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.1 in the sequel.
4. An exchange economy model
Next we discuss the four axioms underlying coherent measures of risk and the addi-
tional two axioms of spectral measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective.
We do this by checking the validity of the six axioms on the natural measure of risk
derived from an exchange economy model, which we call the General Equilibrium (GE)
measure of risk. The GE measure of risk of a portfolio is the amount of cash needed to
sell the risk involved in the portfolio to the market. More precisely, it is the minimal
amount of cash needed to add to the portfolio, such that its market price becomes nonneg-
ative. It is easy to see that the GE measure of risk of a portfolio is the negative of its equi-
librium market price.
To specify the GE measure of risk we consider an exchange economy model with two
time periods (t =0 ,t = 1) and uncertainty concerning the state of nature in period t =1 .
We assume that for each state s in the set {1,...,S} its probability of occurrence is objec-
tively known, ps =1 / S.
4 Period t = 0 is identiﬁed with state s = 0. There is a unique non-
durable commodity (income) in each state of nature s =0 ,...,S.
The portfolios (ﬁrms, insurance companies, banks, etc.) are represented as exogenously
given realization vectors in R
S. Their payoﬀ is a proﬁt or loss in state of nature s =1 ,...,S.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the economy can be modeled by means of a
representative agent. However, it is not diﬃcult to extend the model to the case with het-
erogeneous agents. We assume that the consumption set of the agent is R in all states of
nature. His consumption stream is denoted by c ¼ð c0; ...; cSÞ2R
Sþ1.
The agent’s preferences are represented by a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility func-
tion u : R





where v0 : R ! R and v : R ! R are elementary (Bernoulli) utility functions in state 0 and
states s =1 ,...,S, respectively; the scalar   d 2 Rþþ is the subjective discount factor of the
agent.
Moreover, the representative agent is characterized by his (aggregate) endowment
x ¼ð x0; ...; xSÞ2R
Sþ1. The endowment expresses the agent’s consumption possibilities
without trade, depending on the realization of the state of nature. To distinguish between
the sure zero-period endowment and the random ﬁrst-period endowment, we deﬁne
~ x ¼ð x1;...;xSÞ.
4 We shall only employ the equiprobable assumption when comparing GE measures of risk to spectral measures
of risk.
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plete. Without loss of generality we assume that there are S contingent contracts.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A contingent contract for state s (s =1 ,...,S) is a promise to deliver one
unit of income in state s and nothing otherwise. The price of the contingent contract, the
state price, expressed in units of period 0 income, is denoted by ps for s =1 , ...,S.
Furthermore, p0 =1 .
The agent can sell his endowment x, from which he can purchase on the contingent







The agent’s utility function and his endowment deﬁne an economy E ¼ð u;xÞ. The equi-
librium state prices are determined by the notion of competitive equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 4.2. A competitive equilibrium for an economy E ¼ð u;xÞ is a consumption
vector c  ¼ð c 
0;...;c 
SÞ and state price vector p  ¼ð p 
1;...;p 
SÞ that satisfy the following
conditions:







2. c* = x.
We present two suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with nonnega-
tive state prices.
Proposition 4.3. Consider an economy E ¼ð u;xÞ. If the elementary utility function
v0 : R ! R is strictly monotonic and concave and v : R ! R is monotone and concave, then
a competitive equilibrium (c*,p*) exists. Moreover, p 
s P 0 for s = 1,...,S.
Let U denote the set of utility functions u in which the elementary utility functions
v0 : R ! R and v : R ! R are twice diﬀerentiable, v0
0 > 0, v00
0 6 0 and v0 P 0, v00 6 0.
Proposition 4.4. Consider an economy E ¼ð u;xÞ.I fu 2 U, then the competitive equilibrium












P 0; s ¼ 1; ...; S: ð11Þ
The proofs of Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 are standard results in microeconomic theory,
see for instance Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
Under the assumptions of Proposition 4.3 or Proposition 4.4 one can deﬁne the equi-
librium price of any portfolio Z 2 R
S.
Deﬁnition 4.5. If (c*,p*) is a competitive equilibrium of an economy E ¼ð u;xÞ, then the
equilibrium price, q 
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Note that the discount factor is endogenously determined in the exchange economy model.
5. General equilibrium measures of risk
Now we can deﬁne the GE measure of risk of a portfolio as the negative of its equilib-
rium market price.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Consider an economy E ¼ð u;xÞ with competitive equilibrium (c*,p*) and
a domain V. The GE measure of risk is the map qu;x : V ! R, where qu;xðZÞ¼  q 
Z for any
Z 2 V.









Notice that qu,x is a linear function.
Example 5.2. Consider an economy E ¼ð u;xÞ and a domain V. Let v0ðc0Þ¼c0   1
2ac2
0
and vðcsÞ¼cs   1
2ac2
s for s =1 ,...,S, where a 2 Rþþ such that 1   axs >0 ,s =0 ,...,S,
i.e. the elementary utility functions are quadratic and increasing at c* = x. Since u 2 U,













¼    d
PS
s¼1psð1   axsÞZs
ð1   ax0Þ
: ð15Þ
One can also look at the stochastic part of the aggregate endowment ~ x as representing the
market portfolio, since it captures the aggregate uncertainties. Let us denote the total return
of any portfolio Z by rZ, where the total return is the payoff vector divided by the price:
rZ ¼ Z=q 
Z. It is well known (see for instance Geanakoplos and Shubik, 1990) that with a
quadratic utility function the CAPM formula holds. It relates the total return of any port-
folio to the total return of the market portfolio as follows:




Note that the total return of the reference instrument is given by r1 =1 / d. From
q 





r1 þ bZðEðr~ xÞ r1Þ
: ð17Þ
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folio Z is its discounted expected loss   E(Z)/r1 =  dE(Z), corrected with its risk relation
to the aggregate endowment.
Using the diﬀerentiability assumption let us denote the set of GE measures of risk on V
by GV, where
GV ¼f qu;x : V ! Rju 2 U;x 2 R
Sþ1g:
Let us discuss some properties of GV.
Proposition 5.3. Any qu,x 2 GV is a coherent measure of risk.
Proof. By Proposition 4.4, p 
s P 0 for s =1 ,...,S. Using this fact and the linearity of qu,x
monotonicity, subadditivity and positive homogeneity follows immediately. For transla-
tion invariance note that d ¼
PS
s¼1p 
s by Eq. (13). Then for all Z 2V, for all a 2 R such
that Z + a1 2 V, we have




















Z   da ¼ qu;xðZÞ da:  
Note that GE measures of risk are coherent measures of risk under the assumptions of
Proposition 4.3 as well. Interestingly, in Proposition 6, Jaschke and Ku ¨chler (2001) pre-
sents a similar result for a family of normalized, nonnegative price systems.
As GE measures of risk are coherent and their linearity also implies comonotonic addi-
tivity, so far ﬁve out of six axioms of spectral measures of risk are satisﬁed by them. The
sixth one is law invariance. The following example shows that GE measures of risk are not
law invariant.
Example 5.4. As a special case of Example 5.2 consider 2 states of nature at t = 1 with
equal probability of occurrence. Let   d ¼ 1a n da = 1. Two portfolios, X
1 and X
2, the
aggregate endowment, and the state prices calculated by Eq. (15) are given in Table 3.
Let us assume that X
1,X
2 2 V. It is easy to see that b X 1 and b X 2 have the same
probability distribution. However, qu,x(X
1) = 0.9 5 1.05 = qu,x(X
2), so law invariance
fails.
Note that the two portfolios in Table 3 are related diﬀerently to the economy. Portfolio
X
1 is larger when x is smaller, whereas X
2 is smaller when x is smaller. Although the two
portfolios have the same mean, X
1 is a better hedge against the aggregate uncertainty.
That is why the GE measure of risk of X
1 is smaller than the GE measure of risk of X
2.
Table 3
A GE measure of risk which is not law invariant
sp s X
1 X
2 xp  
s
0– – – 0 1
1 0.5  1  2 0.2 0.4
2 0.5  2  1 0.5 0.25
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Most of the GE measures of risk are not law invariant. In Example 5.4 all that is needed
is that the state prices are diﬀerent, which is the case in a generic economy. The failure of
law invariance tells us that the stochastic part of the aggregate endowment (or market
portfolio, in terms of CAPM) should be taken into account, when calculating the risk
of a portfolio. Nevertheless one can generalize law invariance in such a way that GE mea-
sures of risk satisfy them. The point is to look at the joint distribution of a portfolio and
the stochastic part of the aggregate endowment.
Deﬁnition 5.5. A measure of risk q : V ! R is generalized law invariant if for all X,Y 2 V
such that for all s =1 ,...,S
Prðb X ¼ X s and ^ x ¼ xsÞ¼Prðb Y ¼ X s and ^ x ¼ xsÞ;
we have q(X)=q(Y).
Proposition 5.6. GE measures of risk are generalized law invariant.
Proof. It is easy to see from Eq. (12) and Deﬁnition 5.1 that any qu,x 2 GV is generalized
law invariant. h
6. Connections: Spectral and GE measures of risk
In this section we show the conditions under which spectral measures of risk as deﬁned
in Deﬁnition 3.1 are GE measures of risk as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.1. Then we characterize
GE measures of risk.
Deﬁnition 6.1. A vector ~ x 2 RS and a set V   RS are comonotonic if ~ x and Z are
comonotonic for every Z 2 V.
Proposition 6.2 says that all the spectral measures of risk are GE measures of risk if and
only if their domain is comonotonic with the stochastic part of the aggregate endowment,
i.e. all the vectors in V are comonotonic with ~ x, their values go up and down together
event by event.
Proposition 6.2. Assume x is given and it has different outcomes in states s = 1,...,S.
Moreover, let V contain S linearly independent vectors which are comonotonic with ~ x. Then
for every M/ there exists a GE measure of risk qu,x 2 GV such that
Table 4





i)  1.5  1.5
bXi 0.7593  0.6508
qu,x(X
i) 0.9 1.05
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if and only if ~ x and V are comonotonic.
Proof. Since ~ x has diﬀerent outcomes in each state of nature by assumption, without loss
of generality we can assume that x1 < x2 <    < xS.
(() We show that comonotonicity is suﬃcient. Take any spectral measure of risk, M/
and any Z 2 V. Since ~ x and V are comonotonic, ~ x and Z are also comonotonic. Let us
search for a GE measure of risk qu,x 2 GV satisfying the equation M/(Z)=qu,x (Z). Since











From Eq. (13) the discount factor is determined as






Using Eq. (19) and the assumption that p1 ¼   ¼pS ¼ 1
S, Eq. (18) reads as


























In Eq. (21) two weighted averages of Z should coincide. Since ~ x and Z are comonotonic, a
larger ~ x implies a larger or equal Z. Thus the ordered and the non-ordered statistics of Z
coincide, i.e. Zs:S = Zs for all s =1 ,...,S. The weights on the left-hand side are by deﬁni-
tion normalized, nonnegative, and non-increasing. The weights on the right-hand side are
also normalized, and it is easy to see that v can be chosen monotone and concave to obtain
the same weights.
()) We show that comonotonicity is necessary.
By assumption V contains S linearly independent vectors which are comonotonic with
~ x. Let us denote them by Z1;...;ZS 2 V , where S ¼ S. Since for all   s ¼ 1;...;S we have





s for all s ¼ 1; ...; S; ð22Þ
that is the ordered and the non-ordered statistics of Z
  s coincide. Since the proposition
should hold for any given M/, let us take a spectral measure of risk with different /s in each
stateofnature. Weshowindirectly thatif ~ xandVarenotcomonotonic,thenthere isnoGE
measure of risk qu, x 2 GV such that M/(Z) yields the same number as qu,x(Z) for all Z 2 V.
If M/ðZ  sÞ yields the same number as qu;xðZ  sÞ for   s ¼ 1; ...; S, then using the logic of











for   s ¼ 1;...;S: ð23Þ





S are linearly independent, the equations in (23) determine that
v
0ðxsÞ¼/s for s ¼ 1;...;S: ð24Þ
Now take any Z 2 V which is not comonotonic with ~ x (such Z exists since ~ x and V are not
comonotonic). It follows from the deﬁnition of comonotonicity that there exist states of
nature s1 and s2 in which
xs1 < xs2 but Zs1 > Zs2: ð25Þ







Both sides of Eq. (26) are weighted averages of Z. The left-hand side assigns strictly
decreasing weights to the ordered statistics of Z. The right-hand side assigns the same








We have a contradiction. h
Note that we had to assume in Proposition 6.2 that ~ x has diﬀerent outcomes in each
state of nature. In a generic economy this assumption is satisﬁed. The second assumption
was that V contains S linearly independent vectors which are comonotonic with ~ x.I ti s
easy to check that this assumption is satisﬁed if V contains all the vectors which are
comonotonic with ~ x or if V contains a convex cone generated by ~ x and S   1 linearly
independent vectors. However, if we only require that V contains ~ x, then Proposition
6.2 cannot be proven as the following example shows.
Example 6.3. Suppose V ¼f~ x;Zg, where ~ x and Z are given in Table 5.
Note that the vector ~ x and V are not comonotonic in Table 5, since Z 2 V is not
comonotonic with ~ x. We show that in this example for every M/ there exists a GE
measure of risk qu,x 2 GV such that M/(Z)=qu,x(Z) for all Z 2 V, although ~ x and V are
not comonotonic. Using the normalized version of Eq. (21) we have that M/ and qu,x lead
to the same number for ~ x if
/1 þ 2/2 þ 3/3 ¼ v
0ð~ x1Þþ2v
0ð~ x2Þþ3v
0ð~ x3Þ; and for Z if ð28Þ





Z is not comonotonic with ~ x
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/1 þ /2 þ /3 ¼ v
0ð~ x1Þþv
0ð~ x2Þþv
0ð~ x3Þ¼1; and by definition ð30Þ
/1 P /2 P /3: ð31Þ

























Since v is assumed to be concave,
v
0ð~ x1Þ P v
0ð~ x2Þ P v
0ð~ x3Þ should hold: ð35Þ
From Eq. (31) we have that /2 P /3. This observation implies with Eq. (32) that
v0ð~ x1Þ P /1; with Eqs. (33) and (34) that v0ð~ x2Þ P v0ð~ x3Þ; and with Eq. (33) that
v0ð~ x2Þ 6 /2. Since /1 P /2 from Eq. (31) the inequalities in Eq. (35) are clearly satisﬁed.
The strong requirement in Proposition 6.2 is that ~ x and V should be comonotonic to
represent all the spectral measures of risk by GE measures of risk. In this case all the vec-
tors in V are dependent in the strongest form on the stochastic part of the aggregate
endowment, their value should always go up and down together event by event. The larger
the number of states S, the more stringent this assumption is.
We can characterize the set of GE measures of risk as follows.
Deﬁnition 6.4. A measure of risk q : V ! R satisﬁes the pricing kernel property on V if
there exists a vector c 2 RS





The vector c is interpreted as the pricing kernel, and the measure of risk of portfolio Z is
the negative of its price, induced by the pricing kernel. Let us denote by PV the set of risk
measures satisfying the pricing kernel property on V. Then we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 6.5. The set of GE measures of risk on V coincides with the set of risk measures
satisfying the pricing kernel property on V, thus GV =P V.
Proof
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S
þ. Using the notation cs ¼ p 





pscsZs; c 2 R
S
þ; ð38Þ
thus qu,x satisﬁes the pricing kernel property.
PV   GV. Let us take any measure of risk   q 2 PV satisfying the pricing kernel property
on V. By deﬁnition there exists a vector c 2 R
S
þ such that for all Z 2 V we have that




We show that there exist a quadratic utility function u and endowment x 2 R
Sþ1 such that
for all Z 2 V we have that   qðZÞ¼qu;xðZÞ. Let v0ðc0Þ¼c0   1
2ac2
0 and vðcsÞ¼cs   1
2ac2
s for
s =1 ,...,S. In equilibrium c* = x. We know from Eq. (15) that





¼    d
PS
s¼1psð1   axsÞZs
ð1   ax0Þ
: ð40Þ




psð1   xsÞZs: ð41Þ
By setting xs such that cs =( 1  xs), s =1 ,...,S, Eqs. (39) and (41) deﬁne the same mea-
sure of risk. As v0
0 ¼ 1a n dv0
s ¼ cs;s ¼ 1;...;S, the monotonicity requirements of the ele-
mentary utility functions are satisﬁed. h
Thus GE measures of risk are the only measures of risk satisfying the pricing kernel
property. They are linear functions induced by S nonnegative parameters (c1,...,cS).
On the other hand spectral measures of risk are piecewise linear functions, also induced
by S parameters (/1,...,/S), which are applied to the ordered statistics of the portfolio’s
payoﬀ vector. Thus, although the cardinalities of their sets are the same, under some tech-
nical assumptions spectral measures of risk are GE measures of risk if and only if the
orderings of all the portfolio vectors are the same as the ordering of the market portfolio.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we discussed coherent and spectral measures of risk from a general equilib-
rium (GE) perspective. Coherent measures of risk can be deﬁned by four axioms: monoto-
nicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, translation invariance. Adding two more
axioms, law invariance and comonotonic additivity leads to spectral measures of risk.
We considered the discrete setting and a general domain V   R
S. We proved that it is also
true in the discrete setting with unrestricted domain, i.e. if V ¼ R
S that spectral measures of
risk are the only coherent measures of risk satisfying law invariance and comonotonic addi-
tivity. However, we have shown examples where on a general domain V this may not hold.
We deﬁned a natural measure of risk coming out of a general equilibrium model. The
GE measure of risk of a portfolio is the negative of its equilibrium market price. Checking
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We found that GE measures of risk are coherent measures of risk. This way the four axi-
oms of coherent measures of risk are supported from a general equilibrium perspective.
Thus Value at Risk and other non-coherent risk measures cannot be associated with
our general equilibrium framework.
However, GE measures of risk do not satisfy law invariance, but only a generalized ver-
sion of it, in which the market portfolio is also taken into account. Since spectral measures
of risk are law invariant, we can conclude that in general, when calculating the risk of a
regulated entity, spectral measures of risk do not take into account its relation to the mar-
ket portfolio, leading to an under- or overestimation of risk. The same idea is shown by
our result that spectral measures of risk are GE measures of risk if and only if all the reg-
ulated entities are comonotonic with the market portfolio, i.e. their values go up and down
together event by event. Finally, we showed that GE measures of risk are the only mea-
sures of risk satisfying the pricing kernel property, which means that any nonnegative pric-
ing kernel can induce them as the negative of the equilibrium market price.
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